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The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift. The Patriot Act was expeditiously
passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S.
would not sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law
enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland. The
next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of
Homeland Security. This is a clear sign that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal
government. Even the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence
Community and have responsibilities that focus on counterterrorism. I do not contend that the
rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the continued existence of other terrorist networks around the
globe is not a serious threat. These are very serious threats to American national security and as
such should receive substantial focus. I will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state

actors has allowed nation-states—like Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power
within the international system. State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States
by corrupting our core values, our government, and our economy. Suppressing such attacks is
imperative to U.S. security.
The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their
aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening. This resentment and reassertion
of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously seeks more
control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert more force as it
deems necessary. In recent years the President of the Russian Federation has increased his antiAmerican rhetoric. In a recent speech at the Valadi Club forum, he asserted that the unilateral
dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked in an
effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.1
It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger
Russia look like? How will their power and influence progress in the coming years? These are
questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a
holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy
decisions. This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers can
more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy goals by identifying
how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their objectives. This paper
will begin with a review of the practices of the IC. Then for context I will provide a brief history
of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.-Russian relations, a brief

1

Vladimir Putin, Speech to the Valdai Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXh6HgJIPHo.

review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and recommendations to strengthen the
U.S. strategy.
What can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a balance of power that
will provide renewed stability within the international system?

I propose there are three key

steps the United States can and should take. First, the Intelligence Community (IC), foreign
policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the Russian perspective and
especially President Vladimir Putin. Second, the Intelligence Community should shift the focus
of intelligence from a science back to an art and refocus resources toward state actors. Finally,
U.S. policymakers should find a way to better utilize the intelligence presented to them.
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What is security? This word we use almost daily can refer to many things. It can refer to
a feeling of safety or to the actions implemented for the physical protection of a structure or
person.

Most often, in the United States, the term is used in coordination with the term

“homeland.” Homeland Security or National Security refers to the methods used by the U.S. to
protect the citizens, leaders, infrastructure, and ideals of the Republic in which we live. Though
the Department of Homeland Security was recently established, the idea of security has been
prominent throughout the history of this country and of all nations around the world. Classic
political philosophers were idealistic in their writings about humanity and government; however,
Thomas Hobbes describes human nature as nasty and argues that it leads to the “continual fear of
violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”1 It is this
uncontrollable human nature, according to Hobbes, that lends the need for civil society since fear
of violent death is the predominant passion.2 It seems that this is the prevailing theory even
living in civil society today where fear and survival dictates how a state operates. In most
countries around the world, security is one of the most prominent issues. In general, most
Americans, unlike many around the world, still feel safe in their “immediate communities.”3
However, any fear they do perceive is from terrorism committed by non-state actors. Most do
not perceive a threat from other State actors. They have long since abandoned this fear due to
the prominence of the U.S. around the world and the isolation from neighboring hostile powers.
This is a mistake. State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States by corrupting
our core values, our government, and our economy. Suppressing such attacks is imperative to
U.S. security.
1

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc., 1994), 74.
2
Ibid., 74.
3
Gallup, “In U.S., 37% Do Not Feel Safe Walking at Night Near Home,” November 24, 2014,
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How is security achieved? There are many variations within the history of the U.S.
security policy and the plan is variable depending on the geopolitical climate. On the most basic
level, the U.S. utilizes a combination of military strength, diplomatic efforts and a robust
intelligence community. These key components are always present within every Administration
though the degree of focus fluctuates. The size of the military often changes depending on the
goals of the current president. Diplomatic ties are always of importance as they help protect
strategic advantage around the globe in case a military conflict arises. The U.S. would not have
troops placed around the world without cooperative relationships.

The third prong, the

Intelligence Community (IC), has continued to grow in size and importance. Mention of the IC
generally invokes images of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security
Agency (NSA) for most individuals. However, they comprise only a small portion of the entire
puzzle. There are sixteen agencies within the IC.4 They work both independently and in
coordination with the other components to provide actionable intelligence products to politicians
so they can make foreign policy decisions.

Policymakers must more effectively utilize

intelligence to ensure that other states cannot disrupt and destabilize the U.S.
The IC uses a variety of methods to achieve their mission. There are four elements of
intelligence:

collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.5

Collection is the

gathering of raw data from a plethora of sources. There are six basic intelligence sources:
signals intelligence (SIGINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT); human-source intelligence (HUMINT); open-source intelligence

4

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community: Members of the IC,”
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic#dia, Accessed April 6, 2016.
5
Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of
Intelligence, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2002), 8.
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(OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).6 Once the data is collected it must be analyzed
because it is usually “fragmentary, ambitious, and susceptible to widely divergent
interpretations.”7 Analysis of the collected data is an attempt to provide a judgment about the
“capabilities, intentions, and actions of another party.”8 The analytical reports are used to advise
the President and other policymakers. These have a significant impact on policy decisions. As a
part of intelligence, covert action is used to “influence political actions directly.” 9 In this way it
is different from the other elements of intelligence. Finally, counterintelligence “seeks to protect
a society (and especially its intelligence capabilities) against any harm that might be inflicted by
hostile intelligence services.”10
The IC is a key component of the U.S. foreign policy strategy. They provide vital
information to policymakers and have been important to the mission of protecting the homeland
since its inception. Collecting information against your adversaries has been in practice in the
United States since the Revolutionary War when General George Washington used spies to
obtain a tactical advantage over British soldiers.11 The IC became main stream after WWII when
the U.S. and the Soviet Union used espionage to gain strategic gains during the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War brought a sense of peace to the American public.

The

dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 began the shift in the foreign policy of the United
States; later the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 solidified the
shift of focus to asymmetric non-state actors. That is not to say that the Intelligence Community
does not collect information in all parts of the world or that Congress and the President do not
6

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community: Members of the IC,”
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2, Accessed April 6, 2016.
7
Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 8.
8
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Ibid., 8.
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Ibid., 9.
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Alexander Rose, Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring, New York:
Bantam Books (2006), 14.
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consider state actors when making foreign policy decisions; however, preventing the next
terrorist attack reigns supreme.
The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift. The Patriot Act was expeditiously
passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S.
would not sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law
enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland. The
next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is now the largest agency in existence.12 This is a clear sign
that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal government. Even the U.S. Department of
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence Community and have responsibilities
that focus on counterterrorism. I do not contend that the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the
continued existence of other terrorist networks around the globe is not a serious threat. These are
very serious threats to American national security and as such should receive substantial focus. I
will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state actors has allowed nation-states—like
Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power within the international system.
I would argue that it is vital that American intelligence not lose focus on the world
powers because they have not forgotten about the U.S. According to Henry A. Crumpton—
former CIA Clandestine Service Officer—“[b]oth Russia and China probably have more
clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United States now, in the second decade of the
twenty-first century, than at the height of the Cold War.”13 It is important for the U.S. to realize

12

Donald F. Kettle, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
2007) 55-120.
13
Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York:
Penguin Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, 133.
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that the threat from Russia did not expire at the end of the Cold War. The focus must be shared
between the new terrorist threats and the long time threats from other established nations. The
current Administration’s fear of conflict and failure to follow through has crippled U.S.
influence. Few U.S. officials believe that Russia is a great threat to security. While being
interviewed during a Senate confirmation hearing to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joseph Dunford stated that Russia presents a potential threat to U.S. national security
based on their capabilities and intent.14 In reaction to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine he stated:
“If you look at their behavior, it’s nothing short of alarming.”15 In response, a State Department
spokesman stated that Secretary of State John Kerry does not see Russia as an existential threat”
despite their recent aggression.16 This type of opinion must be reversed.
The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their
aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening. I believe that this resentment
and reassertion of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously
seeks more control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert
more force as it deems necessary.
In recent years the President of the Russian Federation—Vladimir Putin—has increased
his anti-American rhetoric. In a recent speech at the Valadi Club forum, he asserted that the
unilateral dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked

14

Matthew Rosenberg, “Joint Chiefs Nominee Warns of Threat of Russian Agression,” New York
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Talkin,.” Washington Post (July 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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in an effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.17

The increasing

propaganda and aggression outside Russian borders increase the importance of refocusing
resources for a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy. Obviously, the United States
Department of State is continuously interacting with the leaders of foreign states, but the slow
progression of Russian aggression has made their actions seem disconnected and thereby less
threatening. This has resulted in a U.S. response that is half-hearted and cautious.
It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger
Russia look like? How will their power and influence progress in the coming years? These are
questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a
holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy
decisions. This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers—like
the President—can more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy
goals by identifying how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their
objectives. This paper will begin with a review of the practices of the IC. Then for context I will
provide a brief history of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.Russian relations, a brief review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and
recommendations to strengthen the U.S. strategy.

17

Vladimir Putin, “Speech to the Valdai Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXh6HgJIPHo.

6

Intelligence Community: Background
When discussing the IC, it is important to begin with the definition of intelligence.
Intelligence is the “[i]nformation relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of
policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential
adversaries.”18 Further, intelligence as an activity also involves the collection and analysis of
information and the act of denying information to foes.19

Data is collected using several

methods. For example: espionage, aerial photography, communications interceptions, and the
examination of open source communications (i.e. radio, television, and/or social media).20 The
information to be collected can range from military capabilities to social media posts of
individual citizens. The methods used will always be dependent on the subject of the collection.
For instance, open source collection from newspapers and other media outlets will be more
effective in countries where the regime does not control the dissemination of information.
The scope of intelligence is vast and “remains unclear” since national security is a vague
and adaptable term.21 In times of war the central mission for the IC becomes clearer because
there is a central and imminent enemy. However, in times of peace “it is less clear which foreign
nations, events, or circumstances threaten national security and therefore require the attention of
the nation’s intelligence agencies.”22 The scope of intelligence is more complicated by the
variations of the missions within the sixteen intelligence agencies. The IC includes the agencies
set forth in the following chart.

18

Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 1.
Ibid., 2.
20
Ibid., 2.
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Ibid., 3.
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Figure 1: Members of the IC Community23
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As you can see there are military intelligence agencies, civilian intelligence agencies,
administrative agencies, and law enforcement agencies. Though all of the entities listed have an
overall goal of using their intelligence capabilities to secure the safety of the American public
and infrastructure; they all have different specialties on which they focus.

The Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), for instance, has a primary focus on drug trafficking
networks and the diversion of prescription medications. On the other hand, the Department of
Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is focused on securing the Department of
Energy complexes around the nation and focuses on threats to U.S. energy security. They have
the same goal, but very different primary objectives. The importance of putting all of the pieces
together cannot be overstated.
The Intelligence Community, as mentioned above uses six primary types of data
collection. These six can be sorted into three distinct categories: human intelligence, technical
intelligence, and open-source intelligence. As the name implies, human intelligence collection is
the collection of information from human sources through espionage and the recruiting of
foreign officials who have access to useful material and are willing to pass that on to an

23

Director of National Intelligence, “Members of the IC.”
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intelligence operative.24 This method is risky for both the intelligence operative and the source
providing the data. It is risky for the operative because they are working with individuals who
have chosen to betray those around them. This person could be reliable or they could be a
double agent working for both sides.25 This is the method most individuals are familiar with as it
has been popularized by the media and in spy movies. This was an extremely important method
during the Cold War.
The second category of collection, technical intelligence (TECHINT), “refers to a group
of techniques using advanced technology, rather than human agents, to collect information.”26
It encompasses several of the methods listed above. TECHINT includes: signals intelligence,
imagery intelligence, measurements and signatures intelligence, and geospatial intelligence.
This type of collection resembles techniques used during a law enforcement investigation;
however, it is more sophisticated and has a focus of prevention instead of prosecution.
Finally, open-source intelligence focuses on the collection of information that is available
for public consumption.

Common sources used for collection include newspapers, books,

magazines, radio and television broadcasts, government statements, and social media.27 It is also
common practice to as businessmen, scientists, and travelers to provide information when they
are traveling to locations where it is difficult for an intelligence officer to operate. They are not
collecting secret information; instead, they are asked only to provide information that is not
readily available in the public media.28 According to Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, the
“[i]mportance of open sources in the intelligence process is a matter of dispute and is ultimately

24

Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 11.
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tied to the basic questions about the nature of intelligence”29 which until recently focused on the
covert collection of data through primary sources. I believe that open-source information can be
a vital part of the collection of intelligence because it can provide important contextual
information. This is especially true in areas where operatives do not have the ability to move
freely due to restrictive regimes. The internet is particularly helpful where media outlets are
controlled by the state if individual citizens have access to social media sites. Where this type of
information is not completely restricted, local information can be retrieved when it otherwise
would be out of reach.
Data collection is only the initial step in the intelligence process. The next step is
analysis of the collected information. Analysis “refers to the process of transforming the bits and
pieces of information collected…into something that is usable by policy makers and military
commanders.”30

The result of analysis is an “intelligence product”31 that can be used to

disseminate information quickly and efficiently. To get a finished intelligence product the data,
despite collection method, must be reviewed, categorized, and organized to look for patterns and
other useful information. Shulsky and Schmitt divide intelligence products into four broad
categories which I find helpful in understanding how processed information is transmitted to
policy makers and military commanders.

The first category is scientific and technical

intelligence. This category is more precise then the other categories as it requires the blending of
intelligence with scientific and/or technical expertise as advanced technology must be managed
from collection to interpretation.32 Second, there is military intelligence. This “deals with
information about foreign military establishments and is needed for planning one’s own military

29

Ibid., 38.
Ibid., 41.
31
Ibid., 41.
32
Ibid., 53.
30
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forces in peacetime or conducting military operations in time of war.”33 The third category is
economic and social intelligence. This is described as being similar to academic social science
research because the data used is rarely from secret sources. 34 Finally, and most important in
terms of this research, is political intelligence. Political intelligence “consists of information
concerning the political processes, ideas, and intentions of foreign countries, factions, and
individual leaders.”35 It is similar to academic and journalistic writings on the topic; however,
access to secret sources is limited groups outside the intelligence community. 36 This is important
in the realm of political intelligence because access to internal information is very limited
depending on the nature of the regime or group being studied.37
Intelligence products can take several forms. Likely the most important is the President’s
Daily Brief (PDB) which—as indicated—the President receives on a daily basis.

It contains

information from secret sources on the “intelligence items with the highest significance.”38
Circulation is limited to the President, Vice President, and a handful of senior level executive
officials chosen by the President.

39

There is also a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB)

with fewer limitations on circulation that is provided to and tailored to the needs of the senior
government officials responsible for national security.40 These two briefs represent one issue
with the intelligence community; the issue of fulfilling the “current intelligence” functions. This
problem was best outlined in a Senate report which dubbed the problem the “current events
syndrome.” This report stated the following.

33
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“The task of producing current intelligence—analyzing day-to-day events for quick
dissemination—today occupies much of the resources of the DI [Directorate of
Intelligence]. Responding to the growing demands for information of current concern by
policymakers for more coverage of more topics [sic], the DI has of necessity resorted to a
“current events” approach to much of its research. There is less interest in and fewer
resources devoted to in-depth analysis of problems with long range importance to
policymakers…
According to some observers, this syndrome has had an unfavorable impact on the
quality of crisis warning and the recognition of longer term trends. The “current events”
approach has fostered the problem of “incremental analysis,” the tendency to focus
myopically on the latest piece of information without systematic consideration of an
accumulated boy of integrated evidence. Analysts in their haste to compile the day’s
traffic, tend to lose sight of underlying factors and relationships.”41
Another type of intelligence product is Indications and Warnings (I&W) which is the
analysis of the probable steps and enemy would most likely take to prepare for an armed attack.42
The extent of the threat is based on the number of indicators present and the totality of those
indicators.43 The I&W product is more useful military matters; it is much more difficult when
examining political matters.44
The final set of reports I will discuss include, the basic intelligence report (BIR), periodic
reports, and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). A basic intelligence report paints a picture
of a specific situation of concern based on multiple forms or “all-source” intelligence.45 For
example, a BIR on a nation’s political system could include: “an account of all the major
political forces and personalities, their traditional views and interest, and the ways in which they
have related to each other.”46 Periodic reports are more in depth and generally focus issues
related to regional reviews, terrorism reviews, proliferation, arms trading, and narcotics.47 The
National Intelligence Estimate is the “most authoritative statement on a subject by U.S.
41
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intelligence agencies collectively.”48 It is intended to take a broad view of a subject and project
the current situation into the future.
These intelligence products are used—as previously noted—to inform the decisions of
policymakers. These reports are a key to the decisions that are made by the President and
Congress. However, like the “current events syndrome” within the intelligence community, the
policymakers are even more concerned with current events. They are often jumping from issue
to issue and crisis to crisis; therefore, they are unable to obtain the area knowledge to make the
best possible decisions. Most do not have foreign policy knowledge and experience; before they
were congressmen they were doctors, farmers, or another field that would not lend the
understanding necessary for effective foreign policy decision making. Congressman Will Hurd
is a former intelligence officer for the CIA. In an interview in May 2015, he stated that he was
shocked by the caliber of the policymakers understanding of the world.49 The divide between
information collection and policymaking is distressing. Those making decision should have a
good working knowledge of the peoples of the world. With this in mind, this paper will move
into a brief history of the development of the Russian Federation.

48
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Historical Development of Russia
The historical origins of the Russian Federation are primarily the East Slavs.50 The East
Slavs were and “ethnic group that evolved into the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian
peoples.”51

The major pre-soviet states of the East Slavs were “medieval, Kievan Rus’,

Muscovy, and the Russian Empire.”52
Kievan Rus’—the first East Slavic state—“emerged along the Dneipr River valley.”53
Here Kievan Rus’ “controlled the trade route between the Byzantine Empire and Scandinavia.54
From the Byzantine Empire, Kievan Rus’ adopted Christianity in the tenth century. 55 Between
980 and 1015, Prince Vladimir assisted in the conversion. He led the “forcible conversion of
Kievan Russian to Orthodox Christianity.”56 “Historians David MacKenzie and Michael Curran
note that Vladimir’s emissaries were more impressed with the pageantry and glory of the Greek
Orthodox ritual than with the philosophical depth of Orthodox beliefs.”57 Orthodoxy was chosen
over Judaism, Islam, and Catholicism because one was the “stateless religion of a defeated
people,” one rejected alcohol, and one “lacked splendor.”58 This synthesis of Byzantine and
Slavic cultures defined “Russian culture for the next thousand years.”59 Armed skirmishes
between members of the princely family caused Kievan Rus’ to degenerate and later conquest by
the Mongols in the 13th century was the decisive end.60

50
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After this disintegration, several states claimed to be the heirs of Kievian Rus’.61 One of
these being Muscovy located at the northern edge of the “former cultural center.” 62 Gradually,
Muscovy acquired neighboring territories forming the basis for the Russian Empire. 63 Muscovy
traditions and beliefs were adopted by subsequent civilizations; most notably was the
“subordination of the individual to the state.”64 The Slavic, Mongol, and Byzantine heritage of
Muscovy provided the idea of the dominant state that later culminated in the ultimate power of
the tsar.65 Another characteristic of Russian history that finds its basis in Muscovy traditions is
continual territorial expansion.66

Expansion quickly went beyond ethnically Russian areas and

by the eighteenth century the principality of Muscovy transformed into the Russian Empire.67 It
stretched from Poland to the Pacific Ocean and as Russia expanded west toward Europe they
were forced to begin modernizing their army and adopting Western technologies in order to
compete.68 With the military modernization came an attempt to modernize the country as a
whole which prompted competition between traditional Russian values and Western customs.69
There was another push for modernization after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War
fought from 1853 to 1856.70 However, despite major reforms of the 1860s:
“agriculture remained inefficient, industrialization proceeded slowly, and new social
problems emerged. In addition to masses of peasants seeking land to till, a new class of
industrial workers—the proletariat—and a small but influential group of middle-class
professionals were dissatisfied with their positions. The non-Russian populations
resented periodic official Russification campaigns and struggled for autonomy.
Successive regimes of the nineteenth century responded to such pressures with
61
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combination of halfhearted reform and repression, but no tsar was willing to cede
autocratic rule or share power. Gradually, the monarch and the state system…became
isolated from the rest of society.”71
Even so, Russia continued to play a major role in international politics. Defeat in the RussoJapanese War (1904-1905) “sparked a revolution” where “professional, workers, peasants,
minority ethnic groups, and soldiers demanded fundamental reforms.”72 Nicholas II responded
by providing a limited constitution that was quickly ignored resulting in autocracy again taking
command in the last decade of the tsarist state.”73

By World War I Russia was not ready for

combat and there was an increase in revolutionary pressures.
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Historical Outline
Kievan Rus’ and the Mongols
Prior to Kievan Rus’ there were other peoples who settled in much of the same territory.
Present day Ukraine was occupied by Iranian and other ethnic groups; best known was the
occupation from 600 B.C. to 20 B.C. by the Scythians.74 Later, the Goths and nomadic Huns,
Avars, and Magyars briefly occupied the region during migration between A.D. 100 and A.D.
900.75 These groups did not leave a notable impact on the region. However, the Eastern Slavs
who left a lasting impact on modern day Russia. Kievan Rus’ was the first East Slavic state and
it created a very “complex” and unstable political system.”76 There is little known about the
origin of the Slavs, but it is clear that their two lasting achievements of introducing a variant of
the Eastern Orthodox religion and bringing together the Slavic and Byzantine cultures shaped the
future of modern Russia.
During the two century rule of Kiev by the Slavs, the Grand Prince of Kiev “controlled
the lands around the city, and his theoretically subordinate relatives ruled in other cities and paid
him tribute.”77 Prince Vladimir and Prince Yaroslav brought with them greater state power and
dominance with steady expansion. Prince Vladimir married the sister of the Byzantine Emperor
to extend Kievan reach.78 It was Vladimir that brought Christianity to Kiev; this “reflected his
personal ties with Constantinople” who dominated important trade routes.79 “Adherence to the
Eastern Orthodox Church had long-range political, cultural, and religious consequences.” Since
the church rituals were written in Cyrillic, which was a translation originally prepared for the
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South Slavs, the East Slavs did not have to learn Greek or even latin; therefore, they were
isolated from Byzantine and European cultures.80 In his quest for expansion, Prince Yaroslav
arranged for his sister and three daughters to marry the kings of Hungary, France, Norway, and
Poland.81 It was Yaroslav who prepared and disseminated the first East Slavic law code, built
cathedrals, and founded a school system.82
The ruling clan was unable to maintain the mighty and successful Kievan state because
the growing number of ruling members began to divide into smaller regional factions, they
fought among themselves, and formed alliances with outside groups.83 After the Fourth Crusade
took Constantinople and the associated trade routes the Kievan decline accelerated and Kievan
Rus’ split into many principalities and regional centers.84

These “evolved into three

nationalities: Ukrainians in the southeast and southwest, Belorussians in the north and west, and
Russians in the north and northeast.”85
The Mongol invasion came at the height of the disintegration of Kievan Rus’.

The

impact of the Mongol invasion, beginning in 1223 and continuing until at least 1240 when they
took the city of Kiev, is not completely clear.86
“The Mongols have been blamed for the destruction of Kievan Rus’, the breakup of the
“Russian” nationality into three components, and the introduction of the concept of
“oriental despotism” into Russia. But most historians agree that Kievan Rus’ was not a
homogenous political, cultural, or ethnic entity and that the Mongols merely accelerated a
fragmentation that had begun before the invasion. Some historians argue that the Mongol
occupation resulted in the combination of European and Asian cultures in Russia. “They
claimed that this explained the Russian preference for a simple rural society over
dehumanizing industrialization; for emotion over reason; for spiritual values over
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materialism.”87 Historians also credit the Mongol regime with an important role in the
development of Muscovy as a state.”88

Muscovy/Muscovite Russia (1240-1613)
Muscovy or Muscovite Russia “created a highly centralized and autocratic political
system” and thereby “exerted a powerful influence on Russian society.”89 The principality of
Vladimir-Suzdal’ contained the trading post of Moscow which was at the time insignificant and
surrounded by natural barriers that protected it from the Mongol invasion.90 The development of
Moscow trading post in the state of Muscovy can be attributed to a “series of princes who were
ambitious, determined, and lucky.”91 The princes of Muscovy began gathering Russian lands to
increase population and wealth under their jurisdiction beginning in the fourteenth century.92
Ivan (III) the Great was by far the most successful at this. In 1478 he subdued Novgorod
and Tver’ in 1485; Muscovy gained sovereignty over the ethnically Russian lands in 1480 when
Mongol rule ended; he obtained part of the province of Ryazan’ through inheritance; and
convinced the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl’ to voluntarily surrender themselves to him.93
Ivan III was the first to use the title tsar and he tripled the size of Muscovy during his rule.94 He
used his conquests to provide rewards for those loyal to him. Providing land to army officers
helped him maintain a force for his military campaigns.95 During the reign of Ivan the Great the
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Muscovite princes’ power grew substantially. He married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor
and they adopted Byzantine titles and rituals.96
However, “the development of the tsar’s autocratic powers reached a peak during the
reign of Ivan IV” who was also known as Ivan the Terrible. 97 When Ivan IV was crowned tsar
he was recognized by the Orthodox Church as emperor; her was considered the “legitimate
Orthodox ruler” since Constantinople had fallen to the Ottoman Empire. 98 His reign was known
for extreme violence, but he also “promulgated a new law code, revamped the military, and
reorganized local government.”99 In response to a fire that destroyed much of Moscow, Ivan IV
implemented many changes because he believed the fire was “punishment for his
transgressions.”100 In 1550, he issued a new law code to “ensure that the same laws were applied
equally throughout the newly acquired territories and to protect the lower gentry’s interests
against abuses by regional governors.”101 He also made changes to the bureaucracy. To do this
he created central chanceries to improve efficiency in resource mobilization.102 His final changes
were to the Orthodox Church and were mostly frivolous. For example, he deemed several
harmless hobbies as indecent.103

However, he also modified rituals, put restraints on the

Church’s wealth, and sought to control corrupt practices.104 Later in 1565 he divided Muscovy
into two parts: his personal realm and the public territory.105 He confiscated land that he desired
and destroyed his enemies; he continued to expand territory, but overreached and lost a desirable
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position on the Baltic Sea which drained Muscovy; and led it to a civil war. 106 This civil war
was known as the Time of Troubles.
During the Time of Troubles Ivan the Terrible was succeeded by his son Fedor; however,
due to disabilities the true power sat with Fedor’s brother-in-law Boris Godunov.107 During his
reign the Russian Orthodox Church evolved into an independent entity and then he died without
an heir in 1598; this ended the Rurik Dynasty and Godunov was proclaimed tsar. 108 He soon
died in 1605 allowing a man known as the First False Dmitriy to be proclaimed tsar after
Godunov’s son was murdered.109 Thereafter, Poland briefly occupied Moscow, but they were
pushed out and soon after Mikhail Romanov was proclaimed tsar.110

The Romanovs
The Romanov family held a 300 year reign. In the beginning they were weak rulers who
would have been unable to restore order without lower government employees who continued to
work independently despite weak rule.111 During this time the bureaucracy grew and new
departments were formed. They did not function optimally as they often had “overlapping and
conflicting jurisdictions,” but they functioned just the same.112

The provincial governors

implemented a comprehensive legal code in 1649 which exemplified the extent of state power as
it officially sanctioned serfdom attaching peasants to their domicile and increasing taxes and
regulations.113 There was societal discontent during this time. Expansion continued to both the

106

Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 15.
108
Ziegler, The History of Russia, 32.
109
Curtis, Russia: a country study, 15.
110
Ibid., 15.
111
Ziegler, The History of Russia, 34.
112
Curtis, Russia: a country study, 19.
113
Ibid., 18.
107

21

East and West. The expansion into Ukraine, who had more involvement with Western ideals,
had unforeseen consequences. The Russian Orthodox Church’s isolation from Constantinople
had created an environment where differences in the church texts and practices developed.114
When these differences came to light and the Russian Orthodox patriarch decided to bring the
texts into alignment it was viewed as “improper foreign intrusion” and subsequently the church
divided.115 The tsar’s court was also impacted by Western ideals emanating from Ukraine; there
were cultural intrusions that undermined the Muscovite cultural synthesis and created a path to
transformation.116
Imperial Russia
“In the eighteenth century, Muscovy was transformed from a static, somewhat isolated,
traditional state into the more dynamic, partially Westernized, and secularized Russian
Empire.”117

After a series of conflicts eventually resulting in expansion into conquered

territories of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria, Peter the Great achieved the creation of the Russian
Empire. He did this through a transformation of the military and the government. First, he
created a naval force.118

Second, he reorganized the army to mimic European models.119

Members of the taxpaying population were drafted for lifetime service and officers were drafted
from the nobility class, also for lifetime service; he implemented a system of acquiring rank
based on service rather than birth.120 Third, he reorganized the government structure where he
created a senate to

organize government policy and created a system that allowed the local
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governments to collect taxes and increase state revenue.121 Finally, he created educational
institutions for males in the nobility class; however, this and his requirement that the nobility
mimic social customs and dress of Western cultures, created greater divisions between the
peasants and nobility.

“Peter’s reign raised questions about Russia’s backwardness, its

relationship to the West, the appropriateness of reform from above, and other fundamental
problems that have confronted many of Russia’s subsequent rulers.”122
Following the reign of Peter the Great, there was a series of short lived rulers. The
position of tsar passed around many times until it was assumed by Catherine II in 1762; she
remained in power until her death in 1796.123 Though she minimized them, Catherine II has
strong ties to Europe.

She drew “political inspiration from Voltaire, Didert, and

Montesquieu.”124 “She used Montesquieu’s writings…to justify exercising strong, centralized,
and absolute authority in the extensive Russian Empire.”125 During her reign there was great
expansion to the south and west; the expansion brought more power and also more animosity.
For example, though she gained a portion of Poland when it was divided up this also eliminated
the natural barrier that Poland had provided to Russia.126 Catherine II brought many changes to
the bureaucracy within Russia. She divided Russia into provinces and districts and gave the
provincial governments police, administrative, and judicial systems.127

Catherine also

experimented with social reforms of the Nobility by eliminating their mandatory service and of
the townsmen, but she failed to eliminate serfdom making her reforms insufficient. 128 She was
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also able implement many of Peter the Great’s policies in a more effective and useful manner.
During this time Russia “became a power capable of competing with its European neighbors on
military, political, and diplomatic grounds” and the system she created remained unchanged until
the end of serfdom in 1861.129
Catherine’s son Paul briefly succeeded her as tsar. One of his primary accomplishments
for Russia was the acquisition of Alaska.130 His reign abruptly ended when he was assassinated
in 1801 by a coup after he abandoned Britain and Austria in the war against France.131 His son
Alexander I succeeded him.132 Alexander had an eye toward foreign policy and he rejoined the
battle against Napoleon, but having been overwhelmed by him signed the Treaty of Tilsit and
became Napoleon’s ally in 1807.133 He used this alliance to expand Russia’s territory. As any
relationship between expansionist leaders continues the two became suspicious of one another
which strained the alliance. Eventually Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 troops, but he
was not adequately prepared for the Russian winter and he returned home with only 30, 000
troops. 134 This defeat gave Alexander great power at the Congress of Vienna when the lines of
Europe were redrawn as he was known as the “savior of Europe.”135 It is important to note that
“[h]istorians have generally agreed that a revolutionary movement was born during the reign of
Alexander I. Young officers who had pursued Napoleon into Western Europe came back to
Russia with revolutionary ideas, including human rights, representative government, and mass
democracy.”136
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Just after Alexander’s death, his successor and brother Nicholas I squashed an uprising in
support of a Russian constitution. This led Nicholas to create the Third Section, which was a
secret police charged with restraining Russian society through censorship and other controls
“over education, publishing, and all manifestations of public life.”137 Despite this, Russian
literature and ballet flourished during this time.138 His reign was conservative and repressive.
Questioning the tsar’s authority was no tolerated.139 Those of Russian nationality were favored
as the preferred culture which “implied that Russian civilization was superior to that of the
much-emulated Western nations.”140 The cultural growth and Russia’s power were diminished
after Nicholas moved against the Ottoman Empire over control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles
straights; Nicholas miscalculated his support from the British and French who joined the
Ottomans to defeat Russia.141 The coming centuries were wrought with crisis for Russia.

Revolution 1855-1921
In 1855 the reign of Alexander II began. He instituted reforms in education, government,
military and judiciary because there was no other option after defeat. It was Alexander II who
emancipated the serfs. His plan provided the serfs with land which they were intended to pay for
over a fifty year period and the former owners were issued bonds for their loss.142 The new
peasants were unable to make the payments because the land they received was inadequate for
farming and the former owner often lost their land because they couldn’t work the land without
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the serf workers and the value of the bonds declined.143 Though this was a step forward for
Russia it created additional unintended economic strife. The collapse of the landlords’ control
over the serf population also created a need for new local authorities to attend to the needs of the
people.144 The local councils provided medical, educational, and infrastructure services, but law
enforcement remained a function of the central government.145

According to Ziegler, this

introduced a limited version of the concept of self-governance to the peasants.146
Alexander’s local government reforms created an elected city council system, established
limited Western-style courts with jury systems, established a State Bank, made negligible
attempts to lift censorship, and attempted reform of the military to a reserve system. 147 This
system remained in place until the Revolution of 1917.148

Though many changes were

obstructed after his assassination and his son Alexander III became tsar. During and following
the reign of Alexander the III, radical political parties developed. The most talented of the
radical party leaders was Vladimir L. Lenin who quickly gained traction with his theories of a
worker-peasant alliance.149 Lenin welcomed Russia’s involvement in World War I, beginning in
1914, as he thought it would assist in his revolution and lead to a civil war that would weaken the
regime.150 It was in 1917 when the November coup was a success for Lenin and his Bolshevik
Party.151
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It was during this period that Russia built the Trans-Siberian railroad and sold Alaska to
the U.S. Withdrawing from North America was a sign that Russia was overextending itself. 152
The railroad was an attempt for Russia to consolidate its Easter territories. Russia’s efforts to
consolidate interfered with Japan’s imperial expansion of the Meiji Restoration as both sought
control of Manchuria, which was a Northern Province of China, leading to conflict between the
two.153 The Russo-Japanese War “was a turning point in Russian history” because it led to “a
popular uprising against the government.”154 The internal turmoil and war on multiple fronts
weakened the regime leading to the end of tsarism by 1917 near the end of WWI and beginning
of a new phase in Russian history.155

1922-1991
The Soviet Union, made up of Russia, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian
republics, was established in December of 1922 by the Bolshevik or the Russian Communist
Party.156 The Bolsheviks, led and created by Lenin, quelled the original provisional government
which intended to establish a democracy.157 After Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph V. Stalin
became the leader of the Soviet Union.158 The premise of Communist beliefs were that “the
capitalist system, driven as it is by private profit, is not only unjust but irrational and hencer
inherently unproductive.”159 He quickly implemented government control over existing industry
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and agriculture and developed a powerful industrial economy despite the starvation of many
peasants due to poor agricultural practices on the land they were forced to communally farm.160
In the post-WWII USSR, Stalin expanded the economy and sought to exert his influence
of the spread of communism around the world eventually helping bring about the Cold War with
the United States.161 Until his death in 1953, Stalin ruled with an iron fist through centralized
power. After his death, Nikita Khrushchev won leadership and denounced Stalin’s use of
force.162 However, Khrushchev’s policies produced few gains for the Soviet Union and he was
removed from power in 1964.163 A period of collective governance and shifting power followed.
Eventually Mikhail S. Gorbachev was unanimously chosen to lead the Soviet Union. It was his
“policy of glasnost that freed public access to information after decades of government
repression.”164 However, he did not address the fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet system
and by 1991 the Cold War was nearing its end.165

Modern Day Russia
The Russian Federation was established on August 24, 1991 after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union.166 As suggested by its' name, Russia is structured as a federation. According to the
CIA World Factbook, a federation is a "form of government in which sovereign power is
formally divided - usually by means of a constitution - between a central authority and a number
of constituent regions (states, colonies, or provinces) so that each region retains some
management of its internal affairs; [it] differs from a confederacy in that the central government
160
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exerts influence directly upon both individuals as well as upon the regional units.167 Russia's
capital is situated in Moscow which is located in European Russia and covers an area of 970
square miles.168 Depending on the source, Russia is considered to either be part of Asia or
combination of Europe and Asia. The U.S. State Department classifies Russia as part of, what
they refer to as, Europe and Eurasia.169 However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
considers Russia to be in the Central Asian region; along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Either way, Russia is the world’s largest country; it
covers 17,098, 242 square miles and is bordered by Ukraine, Poland, Norway, Mongolia,
Lithuania, Latvia, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Finland, Estonia, China, Belarus, and
Azerbaijan.170 To put this into perspective, it is twice the size of Canada, which is the second
largest country.171 Below you will find a chart outlining the distance of each border shared with
Russia.
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Table 2: Length of Russian Border Divided by Neighboring Country172
Country

Distance (km)

Country

Distance (km)

Azerbaijan

284

North Korea

19

Belarus

959

Latvia

217

China

3,645

Lithuania

227

Estonia

290

Mongolia

3,441

Finland

1,313

Norway

167

Georgia

723

Poland

432

Kazakhstan

6,846

Ukraine

1,576

The Russian coastline is 37,653 kilometers; it borders the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans. 173
Below you will find a map depicting Russia and its neighboring countries.
Figure 1: Russia: Political Map174
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The Russian landscape varies greatly from West to East. Eastern and Western Russia are
divided by the Ural Mountains. West of the Ural Mountains, European Russia is covered by a
wide plain with low hills.175 To the East of the Ural Mountains is the West Siberian Plain, then
the Central Siberian Plateau, and the Lena Plateau.176 “Russia’s southern border with Mongolia
and its entire Pacific coast are marked by mountain ranges. The border with China is defined by
the Amur River valley. Siberia contains vast coniferous forests, to the north of which is a broad
tundra zone extending to the Arctic Ocean. The southwestern border is marked by the uplands of
the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains. In Russia’s southernmost extremity, flat, fertile
steppe extends between its borders with Ukraine on the west and Kazakhstan on the east. About
10 percent of the country is swampland; about 45 percent is forested.”177
The climate varies as much as the terrain. It ranges from Arctic to temperate. 178 Similarly,
during the summer it will be cool along the Arctic coast and warm near the steeps. 179 During the
winter, temperatures are cool along the Black Sea, but bitterly cold in Siberia.180 For at least six
months of the year, most of Russia is covered with snow and the “weather is often harsh”.

181

As in other locations around the world, the climate in Russia has an effect on all aspects of life.
“The average yearly temperature of nearly all of European Russia is below freezing, and the
average for most of Siberia is freezing or below. Most of Russia has only two seasons, summer
and winter, with very short intervals of moderation between them.”182 However, the Kaliningrad
Oblast differs from much of the rest of the country. Located on the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad has a
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climate similar to the American Northwest, which is a moderate maritime climate. 183 Another
exception to the harsh Russian climate is the Far East. The Russian Far East has a monsoonal
climate; the directions of the winds change from summer to winter resulting in “sharply
differentiating temperatures.”184 Special requirements are necessary in regions of permafrost
where “buildings must be constructed on pilings, machinery must be made of specially tempered
steel, and transportation systems must be engineered to perform reliably in extremely low and
extremely high temperatures. In addition, during extended periods of darkness and cold, there are
increased demands for energy, health care, and textiles.”185 The excessively cold winters also
determine where citizens live and how crops are grown.186 Everything from energy usage,
population centers, and the food supply must work around the harsh Russian climate.
Despite the harsh climate, Russia enjoys a variety of natural resources. The country has
“thousands of rivers and inland bodies of water” providing a substantial water supply and access
to waterway travel across the country.187 Most of the urban populations can be found along the
rivers; four of the largest cities in Russia can be found on the banks of the Volga River which is
the most important commercial waterway.188

However, the population centers are poorly

distributed in relation to the water supply since most of the surface water is located east of the
Ural Mountains and the majority of the population lives in the warmer climates.
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Figure 2: Russia River Map189
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Table 3: Major Rivers in Russia190
River

Length Length
(km)
(miles)

Drainage Outflow
area (km²)

Countries in Russian Regions in the drainage
the drainage basin
basin

Lena River 4,400

2,734

2,418,000 Arctic Ocean

Russia

Irkutsk Oblast, Sakha republic

Yenisei
River

5,539

3,442

2,707,000 Yenisei Gulf, Kara
Sea, Arctic Ocean

Russia,
Mongolia

Krasnoyarsk Krai, Zabaykalsky
Krai, Khakassia, Irkutsk Oblast,
Buryatia, Tyva

Ob River

3,650

2,268

2,972,497 Gulf of Ob

Russia

Volga River 3,530

2,193

1,380,000 Caspian Sea

Russia

Khanty–Mansi Autonomous
Okrug, Tomsk Oblast, Yamalia,
Altai Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast
Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd
Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Samara
Oblast, Tatarstan Republic,
Ulyanovsk Oblast, Nizhny
Novgorod Oblast, Yaroslavl
Oblast, Tver Oblast

Amur River 2,824

1,755

2,824,000 Strait of Tartary

Russia, China Amur Blast,Khabarovsk Krai

Ural River

2,428

1,509

237,000

Caspian Sea

Russia,
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Orenburg
Kazakhastan Oblast, Bashkortostan

Kolyma
River

2,129

1,323

644,000

East Siberian Sea

Russia

Sakha Republic, Chukotka
Autonomous Okrug, and Magadan
Oblast

Don River

1,950

1,220

425,600

Sea of Azov

Russia

Indigirka
River
Pechora

1,726

1,072

360,000

East Siberian Sea

Russia

Volgograd Oblast, Rostov Oblast,
Tula Oblast, Voronezh Oblast,
Lipetsk Oblast
Sakha Republic

1,809

1,124

327,000

Arctic Ocean

Russia

Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Komi
Republic

The above outlines the specifications on ten of the major rivers in Russia. It should provide a
better understanding of the waterway system. This system supported a considerable fishing
industry, but it is now threated by pollution due to poor regulation.191
Water is not the only resource in abundance in Russia. Russia maintains one-sixth of the
world’s petroleum supply and one-third of the natural gas supply.
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Despite the large supply,

much of the supply in European Russia has been depleted making it necessary for Russia to rely
on the deposits located in Siberia.193 Russia also possesses “rich deposits of most valuable
metals, diamonds, and phosphates.”194

Finally, Siberian Russia holds fifty percent of the

coniferous forests found in the world; however, the forest stock is being reduced due to lack of
forest management.195
People and Society
The people of the Russian Federation are known as Russians. The total population of
Russia, as of July 2013, was 142,500,482; the majority of the population is between the ages of
25-54.196 73.8 percent of the total population lives in one of Russia’s major urban centers.197
Table 4: Population by City198
City

Moscow

Saint
Petersburg

Novosibirsk

Yekaterinburg

Nizhniy Novgorod

Populaiton
(millions)

10.523

4.575

1.397

1.344

1.267

According to the 2002 census there were five primary ethnic groups in Russia: Russian, Tatar,
Ukrainian, Bashkir, and Chuvash.199
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Table 5: Ethnic Groups as Percentage of Total Population200
Ethnic Group

Russian

Percentage
of 79.8
Total Population

Tatar

Ukrainian

Bashkir

Chuvash

Other

3.8

2

1.2

1.1

12.1

Ethnic Russians are overwhelmingly the predominant ethnic group. The official language is
Russian; however, there are many other minority languages spoken throughout the country.201
Russian Orthodox is the predominant religion; followed by, Muslims and Christians.202
In the early 1990’s, “Russia began experiencing a negative population growth rate” due
to an increase in infertility, a drop in life expectancy, poor nutrition and health care, and
environmental pollution.203 As of 2013, males have a life expectancy of sixty-four years and
females have an expectancy of seventy-six years.204 The birth rate is 12.11 births for every 1,000
persons and the death rate is 13.97 deaths for every 1,000 persons.205 The birth rate is lower than
the death rate; the population is still likely declining.
Economy
According to the World Bank, Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 2.097 trillion
dollars in 2013.206 During the same year, eleven percent of the total population was at the
national poverty line.207 As of 2012, the unemployment rate was 5.7 percent.208 The Russian
economy has changed drastically since the Soviet Union’s collapse. They have moved to a
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“more market-based and globally-integrated economy” from the “globally-isolated, centrallyplanned economy” it was during the Soviet era.209 The 1990’s brought economic reform that
privatized many sectors; however, energy and defense remain under state control.210 As of 2012,
the GDP was comprised of three sectors: agriculture, industry and services.211 The service
sector is the largest and makes ups 60.1 percent of the GDP.212 The industrial sector is second
as it makes up 36 percent of the GDP and the agriculture sector comprises 3.9 percent of the
GDP.213 The agriculture sector produces grain, sugar beets, vegetables, sunflower seeds, beef,
milk, and fruit.214 The industrial sector includes: coal, oil, gas, chemical and metal extraction and
production; machine building (aircraft and space vehicles); defense industries (radar, missile
production, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery, tractors, and construction equipment, medical
instruments, textiles, handicrafts, and electric power generating and transmitting equipment). 215
The country’s primary export partners are The Netherlands, China, Italy, and
Germany.216 Russia exports petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, wood and wood
products, chemicals, metals, and a wide variety of civilian and military manufactures.217 Primary
import partners include China, Germany, and Ukraine.218 Primary imports include: steel, iron,
vehicles, plastic, meat, fruits and nuts, optical and medical instruments, and semi-finished metal
products.219
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Infrastructure
As of 2013, Russia had 1,218 airports; 594 with paved runways and 624 with unpaved
runways.220 There are also 49 heliports, 87,157 kilometers of railway, and 982,000 kilometers of
roadway.221 There are ports and terminals at Kaliningrad, Kavkaz, Nakhodka, Novorossiysk,
Primorsk, Saint Petersburg, and Vostochnyy. 222 Below you will find maps of the railway and
road systems across Russia.
Figure 3: Russia Railway Map223
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Figure 4: Russia Roadway Map224

Military
Russian Federation military branches include: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Forces,
Airborne Troops, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Aerospace Defense Troops.225 Russian Ground
Forces have the following combat arms: motorized-rifle troops, tank troops, missile and artillery
troops, and air defense of the ground troops.226 Males between the ages of eighteen and twentyseven are eligible for compulsory or voluntary military service.227 There is a one year obligation
of service and reserve obligations to the age of fifty. 228 Russia spends approximately 3.9 percent
of its GDP on military expenditures.229 Russia requires that all males register for the draft at age
seventeen.230

224

Maps of the World, “Russia Roadway Map,”http://www.mapsofworld.com/russia/russia-road-map.html#.
The WorldFactbook, “Russia.”
226
Ibid.
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
Ibid.
230
Ibid.
225

39

Government
As noted above, Russia is a federation; it has a central government and several
administrative divisions. Russia has 46 provinces, 21 republics, 4 autonomous okrugs (regions),
9 krays, 2 federal cities, and 1 autonomous oblast.231 One the next page you will find a map that
displays all of the administrative divisions of Russia. The krays are salmon color, oblasts are
orange, autonomous oblasts are light pink, autonomous okrugs are yellow, and republics are
green. Oblasts are the most prominent type of administrative division and are primarily located
in western Russian; however, much of Russian territory is part of the kray of Krasnoyarsk and
the Sakah Republic. Both are located east of the Ural Mountains.
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Figure 5: Federal Districts of the Russian Federation

The current Russian Constitution was adopted on December 12, 1993. 232 The country
has a civil law system with judicial review of legislative acts.233 The government is comprised
of three branches:

232
233

executive, legislative, and judicial. The Executive Branch is led by a
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president (head of state) who appoints the prime minister (head of government), the chairman of
the Constitutional Court, and the head of the Central Bank of Russia.234 The lower house of
parliament, or the State Duma, is required to confirm these presidential nominations; however, if
they fail to confirm the nomination for prime minister three times, the president can dissolve the
Duma.235 Many presidential nomination do not require approval by the legislature.236 The
president also has the power “to issue decrees that go into effect without the parliament’s
approval.”237
The legislative branch is made up of a bicameral Federal Assembly which has an upper
and a lower house; the upper house is the Federation Council and the lower house called the
State Duma.238 The Federation Council consists of 166 seats; the “members are appointed by the
top executive and legislative officials in each of the 83 federal administrative units.”239 The
members of the State Duma are elected by popular vote and both houses serve four-year terms.240
The judicial branch consists of three high courts: the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Court of Arbitration.241 The members of
all three courts are appointed for life and are appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Federation Council.242 Russia also has an extensive lower court system. This includes a Higher
Arbitration Court, provincial and regional courts, city courts in Moscow and St. Petersburg,
autonomous provincial and district courts, and independent court systems in the republics.243
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The judicial branch is not independent in the same way as the American Court system.
However, according to a Library of Congress report the “judicial branch has moved very slowly
toward and independent role in the post-Soviet era.”244 It took many years for the U.S. Supreme
Court to establish its dominance in the American system; therefore, it is possible that the Russian
courts could move toward greater independence in the future, but it much less likely due to the
differing political climate. It is also less likely because the Russian constitution does not call for
three equal branches of government as the U.S. Constitution does.
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US-Russian Relations
Even during the best of times when the United States and Russia, as part of the former
USSR, were fighting together to defeat Hitler during World War II (WWII), the relationship was
strained and skepticism prevailed. This distrust stemmed from distinct differences between the
ideologies of the two states despite some similar characteristics. As John Gaddis notes, there are
several similarities. Both were born out of revolution, both had advanced across vast frontiers as
continental states, both entered the war as a result of surprise attack, and both embraced
ideologies with global aspirations.245 Upon closer examination, even these similarities represent
stark differences in the U.S. and the former USSR. The American Revolution represented a
break from concentration of power in a single executive. Conversely, the Bolshevik Revolution
was a concentration of power. Based in the theories of Karl Marx, it “involved the embrace of
concentrated authority as a means of overthrowing class enemies and consolidating a base from
which a proletarian revolution would spread throughout the world.”246
At the end of WWII, the two nations had fought very different wars. The U.S., being so
far from their own shores, fought a calculated war that allowed for minimal casualties. 247 The
former USSR was not so lucky. They suffered mass casualties along with excessive property
damage.248 The former Soviet Union and the United States were fighting a common enemy, but
held very different views of how the world should look post-war. The Soviet Union and Stalin,
its ruler since 1924, believed that wartime expenditures should determine how territory was
divided after the war.249 Since the Soviet Union had clearly expended a disproportionately
greater amount of “blood and treasure”, Stalin believed that the USSR should and would get a
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greater proportion.250 However, the disproportionate losses had “robbed that country of the
power required to secure those benefits unilaterally.”251 Stalin wanted “security for himself, his
regime, his country, and his ideology, in precisely that order.”252As a leader he was jealous,
cruel, ambitious, and power hungry; he eliminated his rivals.253 With such a powerful Soviet
Union at his disposal he was more dangerous to the world order than one would expect. He
sought “domination of Europe” just as Hitler had.254 He also hoped that the U.S. and Great
Britain would eventually destroy one another as Karl Marx had predicted that capitalist societies
would do. As Gaddis eloquently stated, this meant that for the U.S. and the U.K., WWII “was a
victory over fascism only—not over authoritarianism and its prospects for the future.”255
Stalin had hoped that his post-war gains could be made peacefully and with the support
of the Americans. Until this point the U.S. had avoided becoming involved in influencing the
state of affairs in Europe. However, Roosevelt had alternative plans for America’s post-WWII
influence in world affairs. He did not plan on shrinking back into isolationist tendencies of times
past. Instead, he sought to influence and to control the balance of power.
There were four primary wartime goals for Roosevelt. First, he hoped to maintain allies
in order to achieve victory as he knew that the U.S. could not defeat both Japan and Germany
alone.256 Second, he hoped to “secure allied cooperation in shaping the postwar settlement” in
order to secure lasting peace.257 Third, Roosevelt hoped that the allies would endorse a post-war
settlement that “would remove the most probable causes of future wars” which included a
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“collective security organization with the power to deter and punish aggression.”258 The fourth
and final goal was to create a post-war settlement that would be approved by the American
people which would mean there would be “no reversion to isolationism.”259 The differences in
the post-war visions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the basic differences in the central
ideologies of the two, and the failure to resolve the differing political objectives is at the heart of
the beginning of the Cold War which lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
When Communism expanded to the East it increased fear and doubt in the United States.
When the Chinese Communists won the battle over the Chinese Nationalists fear was initially
contained because there was no prediction that China would become subservient to the USSR.
The Chinese Communist Party defeated the U.S. sponsored Nationalists without help so the
foreign policy analysts in the U.S. did not foresee the pact between China and the Soviet
Union.260 This did not stop Mao, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, from pledging his
loyalty to Joseph Stalin and recognizing him as the international leader of the Communist
Party.261 This loyalty from Mao led to the Sino-Soviet Treaty which was a pact between the two
nations to come to the other’s aid in the event of an attack.262 This event caused the United
States to change its thinking. The realization that the Soviet Union and China were united in
their fight for communism severely impacted the U.S. position and actions taken in the years
following.
During the same time period there were two high profile espionage cases that became
public. There was always rumor of espionage on both sides; however, this confirmed the fear
and the extent of Soviet espionage. It created the realization that spying made it possible for the
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USSR to create the atomic bomb so quickly.263 The extent of the infiltration was a terrifying
prospect.
By June 1950, Joseph Stalin had provided his blessing for North Korea to invade South
Korea with guaranteed reinforcements from China as needed.264 This calculated risk was taken
because the then U.S. Secretary of State had indicated that the U.S. would not come to the aid of
South Korea; however, Stalin’s blatant disregard for the boundaries set up by the United Nations
(UN) at the 38th parallel was such a direct “challenge to the post-war collective security” that the
U.S. took action.265 This was an outcome not foreseen by Stalin before waging his proxy war.
The Korean War provided no benefit to either the United States or the USSR. Despite this, it is
clear that President Truman’s actions—or restraint—in not deploying the greatest weapon the
U.S. had in its arsenal set a tone for future wars.266 He is the reason that nuclear weapons have
not been used since they were dropped on two Japanese cities as a way to bring WWII to a close.
However, the precedent set by Truman that weapons developed do not always have to be
deployed, was not immediately realized. Even today there is fear that rogue nations or groups
will not abide by this unwritten doctrine.
The Cold War was a time of uncertainty and fear for the American people. The threat of a
nuclear attack always at the front of their thoughts. Both nations employed all manner of
reconnaissance to gather secrets and gain the upper hand. The fight of ideals, the battle between
communism and democracy, reigned for many years, but a shattered Soviet Union dissolved into
a damaged Russia which provided a sense of security to the U.S. However, current President
Vladimir Putin is shifting the West’s complacency toward Russia into curiosity. He is pushing
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boundaries as far as he sees feasible and then backs off until the West’s discomfort with his
actions subsides and then he tests the waters again. He has been doing this for many years.
In 2008, Russia used force outside its own borders for the first time in the post-soviet era.
They became involved in the conflict between Georgia and rebels in South Ossetian—an
independent Georgian territory.267 Russia stated that their actions in Georgia sought to restore
stability, but Russian troops entered undisputed Georgian territory making this claim less than
genuine.268 Further, Russia is forward thinking and patient. During the years preceding the 2008
conflict, Russia was maintaining a “peacekeeping force” in South Ossetia—which operated
primarily as an independent territory—and they issued passports to Ossetians.269 This allowed
them to claim they were intervening on behalf of their own citizens.270 According to Marsha
Lipman, political analyst for the Carnegie Moscow Center, “the vast majority of the Russian
people” approved of “Russia’s behavior” and the action in Georgia.271 This public approval
reflects the overall attitudes of the general Russian population who also seek a stronger place in
the world. It reflects the national pride and desire for more power for Russia. The events in
Georgia are significant because Georgia was an ally of the U.S. Their ability to act with no
retaliation set a precedent.
In 2013, despite pleas from President Obama,

Russia provided asylum to former

National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden who leaked classified information
to the press. Snowden was a systems operator working for Booz Allen Hamilton—a technology
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consulting firm.272

He downloaded and released over 200,000 documents relating to U.S.

eavesdropping activities; many of the documents were designated as “top secret” and the even
more restrictive “special intelligence.”273

In several statements Snowden claimed to be a

whistleblower helping to expose unconstitutional practices used by the intelligence
community.274 The U.S. government has found no evidence that he attempted to go through the
proper channels to raise concerns and Snowden has offered no evidence to support this theory. 275
Even after Snowden was indicted for stealing and exposing state secrets, he is still currently
residing in Russia where he was granted additional asylum.276 Russia granted Snowden a three
year residency extension in August 2014.277 Russia again skated by with little resistance. It is
clear that President Putin has no intention to cooperate with the United States in this matter.
Russia has chosen to harbor a fugitive to prove they have power and are not subject to U.S.
control.
Later in 2014, when Russia decided to take control of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine,
Putin could be confident that the West would not react militarily. The Russians understand the
U.S. fear of being in another war. It was again easy for Putin to claim protection of ethnic
Russians in Crimea as many ethnic Russians reside there. Crimea was part of Russia “for
centuries before Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine as a gift in 1954.”278 This
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provides a limited amount of cover for Putin as he ventures outside his own territory. The
economic sanctions placed on Russia by the U.S. and members of the European Union (EU)
have had little to no success. Putin even retaliated with an embargo on food imports from the
U.S., EU, Canada, Australia, and Norway.279 Putin is protecting his image of power; he will not
look weak in the face of Western attempts to control his actions.
In another act of overt intimidation against the United States, Vladimir Putin sent two
Russian bombers close to U.S. airspace last July 4th. The Russian pilots, intercepted by U.S.
fighter jets, are quoted as saying: “Good morning, American pilots. We are here to greet you on
your Fourth of July Independence Day.”280 This is a clear taunt and an attempt to reestablish a
presence in the international community. I believe, it is also Putin’s way of showing that he is
not afraid of the U.S. This is not an insignificant event. These types of actions are meant to test
his boundaries. Like a child tests a parent to determine how far they can go without punishment,
Putin is testing the international community and in particular the United States to see what will
be tolerated.
Then in late 2015, Russia joined the conflict in Syria. Russia offered to execute air
strikes against the terrorists. Initially, Putin’s bombers targeted areas controlled by the Islamic
State (ISIS); however, they quickly began campaigns in parts of Syria with little ISIS control.281
It was evident that he was targeting the U.S. backed Syrian rebels fighting the Bashar al-Assad
regime. Outwardly, Putin states that he has no loyalty to Assad, but their meeting in October
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2015 was front page news for the Kremlin.282 Early 2016 brought a Russian withdrawal from
Syria. News of the withdrawal was quite abrupt, but was clearly strategic in nature. Russia has
achieved three goals with its involvement in Syria. First, they have shown that Russia is willing
and able to be a player on the international stage. Second, they have put themselves in a position
to be an important part of any future negotiations in Syria. Third, they aided the Assad regime
who is a Putin ally, meaning if Assad does not lose power Putin has a hold in Syria. Most
importantly the strategic withdrawal is allowing Putin to do all three without overextending
Russia’s resources.
Russian Objectives
In 1962, Cyril E. Black wrote that Russia’s policy decisions could have been said “to have been
based primarily on considerations of security.”283

He divided the security considerations into

four components: stabilization of frontiers; assurance of favorable conditions for economic
growth; unification of territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or
national claims; and participation in alliance systems and international institutions.284 I believe
these can still be—in part—used as a relevant guide to understand Russian policy objectives.
Black noted that the stabilization of frontiers was “less a question of geography than of
coming to terms with the political power on the other side of the border.”285

The goal was to

gain stability by eliminating the political power of a neighboring territory. This is the least
relevant component of the foreign policy considerations; however, Russia’s annexation of
Crimea was a way to reduce the political power of Ukraine because there was a push for stronger
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ties with the West in the form of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
European Union. Since NATO was created to curb the spread of Soviet communism, this was
viewed as a direct threat to Moscow because the West was inching closer to their borders.286
Also, Russia has a naval base in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol. 287 Ukraine’s alliance with
NATO or the EU could have jeopardized this strategic base. In this context, Russia’s actions
could have been more easily anticipated and much less surprising to those in the West.
Secondly, Black notes that the theory for best achieving economic growth has varied
among Russian leaders; however, there is agreement that economic strength is a necessity for
national security.288 The current strategy reflects the importance of economic strength as well.
In the midst of animosity with the United States and the West, President Putin has turned to the
East seeking economic partnerships. Russia and China signed an economic deal and financing
agreement in May 2015.289 Putin is quoted as saying, “Today, China is our key strategic
partner.”290 Reducing reliance on Europe for exports reduces the impact of Western sanctions.
The third key component of Russia’s foreign policy strategy is the “unification of
territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or national claims.”291 This
strategy is manifested in Russia’s involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia. In both instances
Russia argued their actions were to protect ethnic Russians. In anticipation of this argument they
issued passports to the citizens of both independent territories prior to becoming entangled in the
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conflicts. A greater understanding of the nature of the Russian foreign policy strategy and what
is driving its leader would have helped to better shape the U.S. response.
The final element of Russian foreign policy, as discussed by Black, is participation in
alliance systems.

Historically, Russia has been involved in short-term alliances of

opportunity.292 A perfect example is the alliance with the U.S. and Great Britain during WWII.
These relationships are based solely on the need for assistance. The only example of long-term
alliances is with the “Communist states of Europe and Asia after 1945.”293
U.S. Strategy
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been the only superpower. Russia seeks to
end this reign. The United States’ place as the primary de facto world leader has been centered
on three central missions:294
1. To manage and guide power relationships in a “world of shifting geopolitical

balances” so a “more cooperative global system can emerge.”
2. To contain civil and regional conflicts, prevent terrorism, and prevent the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
3. To address the inequalities of the human condition and to “prompt a common

response to new environmental and ecological threats to global well-being.”

U.S. policy makers work tirelessly to influence nations around the world and to maintain
the balance of power in a regional setting for U.S. benefit and to ensure strategic advantage
around the globe. This is achieved through mutual agreements and even by providing financial
incentives. However, unlike other states around the globe, expansionist polices are a thing of the
past. The new world view is in favor of maintaining the boundaries as they are drawn. The
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same sentiment is not ingrained in Russian culture. Russia still aims, at a minimum, to regain
lost territory. Modern Russia, like imperialist Russia, sees expanding boundaries as expanding
power. “For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this
relentless, outward thrust threatening all its neighbors. In the Russian mind, the centuries of
sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service
of a claimed superior Russian morality.”295 Failure to understand and fully grasp this sentiment
could result in failed U.S. policies.
In lieu of taking control of new territory, the United States believes that spreading
democracy around the globe is the best way to maintain a peaceful world. A liberal democracy
is a unique form of government. The explanation can be found in part in the Democratic Peace
Theory. Liberal democratic countries are more peaceably disposed to their neighbors. 296 They
behave differently for several reasons. First, liberal democracies do not seek to alter the balance
of power by expanding because stability is extremely important. The best way to protect the
things most valued in a liberal democracy—life, liberty, and property—are through peace.
Historically, the four most common reasons states go to war are religion, honor,
money/resources, and self-defense.297 Liberal democracies rarely initiate war for resources or for
honor, and they do not go to war with regard to religion because liberalism fosters tolerance of
others and their beliefs. Elected leaders are constrained by the people who endure the negative
aspects of war—loss of life, liberty, and property.298 Third, war in the United States no longer
seeks to obtain new resources or territory; therefore, war costs more than the rewards that are
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gained and as a result this motivation of war is contained within a liberal democracy. Finally,
self-defense can lead liberal democracies to war, but as history shows, generally only with nonliberal democracies and other forms of government. “Non-democracies may be dangerous
because they seek other ends.”299 If anything, late intervention into a necessary conflict or war is
more common in a liberal democracy than unnecessary intervention.
The policy of spreading democracy to reduce the risk of war has largely failed leaving a
Mid-East ripe for Russian influence.

As noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National

Security Advisor for President Jimmy Carter, left alone, Russia “could again become a source of
tension and occasionally even a security threat to some of its neighbors.”300 As the world has
seen they have already become a threat in Georgia and Ukraine. No Western response to these
actions will likely result in more of the same.
“Putin’s vision of that future is a backward-looking combination of assertive
nationalism, thinly veiled hostility toward America for its victory in the Cold War, and nostalgia
for both modernity and super power status.”301 It is vital to understand the Russian position for
the U.S. to properly construct a useful foreign policy and military strategy with regard to Russia
and the rest of the world. In a 2001 article in the Los Angeles Times, a poll revealed that 55%
of Russians still view the United States as a serious security threat, but only 8% of Americans
still view Russia as a top concern for U.S. national security.302 Illusions that cause Americans to
lose sight of real threats can only bring troubling surprises.
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Les Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, once said that “[i]f we
treat them as enemies they become enemies, especially because Russia, China and North Korea
are in transition. By keeping Russia at arm’s length we do not encourage them to cooperate on
foreign policy.”

303

This sentiment is reflected in the Obama Administration’s current policy as

they work with Russia in Syria and Iran. Though this is a logical policy on the surface it is not
clear that this will provide any change in Russian attitudes or provide stability for Russia’s
neighbors. Without a deterrent, Russia will continue to threaten its’ neighbors. The U.S. must
be seen as not only the peacekeeper, but also as the superpower who will not back away from
commitments with its’ allies. Though the transplantation of democracy has not been successful
in all instances it should be supported where it has begun to thrive. The U.S. needs a strong and
“stable geopolitical balance in Eurasia promoted by a renewed America. America’s failure to
pursue an ambitious transcontinental geopolitical vision would likely accelerate the decline of
the West and prompt more instability in the East.”304
Brzezinski argues that U.S. success as the guarantor of a renewed West might require
embracing “a truly democratizing Russia into the West.”305 I agree that it would be ideal to bring
Russia into the West, but they have been fighting this for centuries and despite changes in the
government structure they are far from being a democracy. In spite of the federal system of
government, most of the power still lies in the head of state.

The current president has no

intention of falling in line with U.S. constructs. In a statement in March 2014, the Russian
President stated: “They [U.S.] have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that
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they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right.”306 Neither Eastern
nor Western, Russia will not willingly come into the West while the U.S. remains in control.
The distorted view of Russia as a “state pursuing traditional national interests” is bound to result
in more Russian disregard for the international norms set forth by the West.307 Since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy analysts who viewed communism as the basis of all of
Russia’s challenges began focusing on the internal changes happening within Russia.308
Following the rule of Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a policy of openness and
restructuring.309 This shift captivated the foreign policy experts; however, the shift back toward
and authoritarian state masquerading as a constitutional federation has largely been ignored.
Russia’s totalitarian tendencies were present long before communism appeared as the
predominant ideology among the Russian people. Tsars of Russia and its preceding civilizations
ruled most often with an iron fist; oppression of the lower classes has been a central theme in
Russian history. Also a central theme is a shying away from Western values. A change in the
structure of the political system has not changed the power dynamic within the system.
United States foreign policy since the changes began has also largely focused on the
internal stability of Russia as the primary component for peace. “As a general proposition, when
foreign policy toward Russia is:
identified with shaping Russian domestic politics, the ability to influence the external
conduct of the Russian state is weakened. Yet, it is precisely the external actions of
Russia that have historically presented the greatest challenge to international stability.
Indeed, the Western democracies, by making themselves so much a party to Russia’s

306

Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” Presented to the State Duma deputies,
Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives in the Kremlin, Moscow,
Russia, March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889.
307
Kissinger, Does America Need a New Foreign Policy?, 73.
308
Ibid., 73.
309
The World Factbook, “Russia: Background,” https:www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/rs.html.

57

domestic drama, provided an incentive for Russia’s leaders to escape present-day
frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past.”310
The increasing concern “about Russian weakness, possible state collapse, and loose nuclear
material” rather than about any new aggression initiated by Moscow is a problem in the U.S. and
the West more broadly.311
The questions remains: what can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a
balance of power that will provide renewed stability within the international system? I propose
there are three key steps the United States can and should take.

First, the Intelligence

Community (IC), foreign policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the
Russian perspective and especially President Vladimir Putin’s motivations.

Second, the

Intelligence Community should shift the focus of intelligence from a science back to an art and
refocus resources toward state actors. Finally, U.S. policymakers should find a way to better
utilize the intelligence presented to them. I will discuss each in turn.
A new strategy is needed within the IC and political community on how to evaluate
Russian motives and actions. There are two important elements to keep in mind with regard to a
new strategy. You must consider both how Russia developed into the state it is today and
understand Vladimir Putin as a man and leader. The development of both can allow better
prediction of future Russian actions. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden said it best. More
important than even throwing more resources toward Russia is combatting the “analytic
challenge of understanding Putin’s mindset.”312 For ease of analysis, most international relations
theories assume that states are rational actors. This allows for a baseline to be in place when
310
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trying to predict what a state will do or how they might react to a specific situation. However, it
is imperative that the IC stop assuming that Putin is a rational actor and that he will react in a
way similar to U.S. leaders put into similar positions. There is a “failure to absorb that Putin
does not assess his own interests in a way American’s believe he should.”313 They also fail to
see that Putin does not see America as a “friend or partner.”314

He sees the U.S. as the

superpower stopping Russia from regaining its’ glory. Putin’s personal history is important to
consider because his time in the KGB shaped him as a leader. It trained him to be both patient
and misleading. This leads to a “foreign policy comparable to that during the tsarist centuries,
grounding popular support in a sense of Russian mission seeking to dominate neighbors where
they cannot be subjugated.”315
It is just as important to view Russia’s foreign policy from inside the Russian perspective
which is rooted in centuries of beliefs and a shared national history. “[A]n understanding of the
Soviet past is pivotal.”316 As Henry Kissinger stated, “[t]he Atlantic allies owe it to Russia to
acknowledge that it is undertaking a historic transition [to adjust to the loss of its empire even as
it builds historically unfamiliar institutions]...but they do themselves no favor by pretending that
Russia has already accomplished a process of reform that is only in its infancy, or by celebrating
Russian leaders for qualities they have yet to demonstrate.”317 This is a failure of U.S. foreign
policy that emerged during the Gorbachev era. When the Soviet Union fell, the West had hoped
that “the momentum of freedom and democratization would help to institutionalize civil society
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as an autonomous sphere.”318 However, this did not happen. The minimal institutional
changes achieved were reversed after Putin came into power. “The Russians profess to share
these values [sanctity of the individual, civil rights, and rule of law in a constitutionally defined
democratic state] but their political system does not reflect them.”319 Putin’s presidency has
been defined by an increase in state influence over the lives of Russian citizens and an increase
in military and security service control over his administration.320 According to Sergei
Ljubownikow, “little has changed since the end of the Soviet Union.”321 I argue that a foreign
policy based on substantial domestic changes in Russia—as mentioned above—will not produce
positive outcomes for the U.S. when, in reality, little has changed. The U.S. is operating on a set
of assumptions, but they are not in line with the reality of the Russian state.
It has been noted that “[f]or the last 13 years, the way you got ahead in America’s
intelligence services was to specialize in stopping terrorists.”322 Focusing on Russia and Russian
intelligence became old news. The best and brightest have not had incentive to put their skills to
use for anything other than terrorism. Reallocating resources and talent within the IC toward
Russia is a necessary move. This would provide more insight into what is happening in Russia
and provide more data points for analysts to work with. If the intelligence community could
provide better analysis it would assist U.S. leaders in making better decisions toward the foreign
policy strategy.
According to Robert D. Steele, “we [U.S. IC] are unwisely spending 75 billion dollars a
year on global secret technical collection efforts, while spending relatively nothing on
318
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processing, or interagency sharing of data, or on decision support.” 323 Intelligence has become a
scientific process; however, the reliance on technology to find patterns within collected data
removes the most important part of the equation—the human element of the analyst who
possesses a deep understanding of the region or culture in which they are evaluating. The
importance of a cultural and situational understanding cannot be overstated.324 Intelligence
collection might be mostly a science, but analysis must be mostly an art. This also means that
there should be a more comprehensive methodology to the intelligence process. It is imperative
to realize that nothing in a system is “isolated”—it is all interconnected in some way.325
Analysis should focus not only the infrastructure, the land, and the individual actors within a
system, but on the people and the communities in which they live and exist. Several areas of
study are needed to obtain a comprehensive view:

geography, anthropology, psychology,

economics, religions, demography, criminology, political affairs, and archeology. 326 In his book,
Kerry Patton is arguing for the formalization of a new specialty in the intelligence community—
sociocultural intelligence (SOCINT) which would include the above specialties in the analysis
and collection processes. He argues that SOCINT needs to be formalized so that SOCINT
operatives can be trained.327 However, I would argue that it is more important to equip all
operatives and analysts with the training needed to collect and analyze data in a more
comprehensive method. Better intelligence products equal better policy.
Finally, I argue that it is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and improve itself
domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent years. The best
323
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way to do that is for policymakers to gain a greater understanding of world affairs so they can
more effectively utilize the intelligence community in all aspects of foreign policy. According to
Congressman Will Hurd who is a former CIA officer he was “shocked by the caliber of the
policymakers’ understanding of other parts of the world.”328 Congressman Hurd has a unique
perspective as he is the only member of congress to ever serve in the intelligence community.329
All congressmen have a unique background. There are lawyers, doctors, and farmers. While
these professions lend expertise in other necessary policy areas it creates a gap between the
knowledge needed to make foreign policy decisions and their understanding of the world. If the
IC would work to produce unclassified comprehensive cultural studies for policymakers that
would serve as a source of basic familiarity and awareness, I believe it would be beneficial in the
decision making process.
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Conclusions
Russia—and other rogue nations—achieve their strategic interests by destabilizing the
United States. The U.S. emphasis on the threat of terrorism and the wars in both Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2001 has provided Russia with the opportunity to regain regional strength.
While the U.S. was distracted, Russia took the time to exert itself in the former Soviet states and
to begin building stronger economic relationships outside of the West. Russia also hopes to
continue to keep the United States “distracted” in the near future.

For example, Russia’s

involvement in Syria and Iran are attempts to prolong the “U.S. obsession with Iran.” 330 The
Assad regime in Syria is supported by Iran; therefore, a “pro-Iranian Syria” would be in the
Russian interest because it would serve as a U.S. distraction from Russian affairs. 331 The U.S.
must avoid being sidetracked as it allows Russia to evolve into a stronger and more powerful
state.
Destabilization of the U.S. government has been a tactic of Russia for decades.

In 1948,

Whittaker Chambers--one of the most important Communist Defectors--testified before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. At the hearing he stated that he had assisted in organizing a small
group of Communist Party members to infiltrate the U.S. government in Washington, D.C.332
Specifically, he revealed that Alger Hiss--principal advisor to the Secretary of State--was a Soviet spy that
had been turning over confidential State Department documents and handwritten notes to the Soviets.333
The knowledge of confirmed infiltration allowed the Soviets to not only gain valuable intelligence from
inside the U.S. government, but it allowed them to incite fear in the American public and disrupt society
even if this was not the original intention. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed he had a list of 205
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people who were known members of the Communist Party that worked in the State Department. 334
During this period in U.S. history, American citizens were unfairly accused and tried for being communist
supporters despite a lack of evidence most of the time.335 McCarthyism reigned for several years and
veered the American belief in justice off course. Russia succeeded in disrupting the government and
society. They seek to do the same today.
Despite this my research did not reveal any U.S. government agents who were talking or
writing about the threat from Russia; except for the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--General
Joseph F. Dunford. As previously noted, he outlined his concerns over Russian behavior during his
confirmation hearing before the Senate. The news media and those in academia are the only ones raising
the issue in a public forum. It is possible that there are government employees who are researching and
discussing this threat internally; however, these employees would not have the authority to speak on
behalf of the government. Lower level government employees are not allowed to speak on behalf of the
government or voice concerns to the public. Administrative employees serve at the pleasure of the
President and generally fall in line with the President’s policies. The current Administration does not
acknowledge that the U.S. has enemies. Instead, they seek only diplomacy with hostile nations.
Further, Russia is being served by the current foreign policy strategy which has failed to see an
emerging Russia as a threat. For example, President Obama’s Executive Orders “authorizing sanctions on
individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” have
placed economic sanctions on Russia to disrupt financing of exports, banks, and energy companies. 336
These have caused damage to the Russian economy by limiting the exportation of oil to the U.S. and EU
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nations; most of Russia’s oil exports go to the West.337 Though sanctions have had the intended effect of
hampering the Russian economy, Putin has retaliated in an attempt to also destabilize the U.S. economy.
As mentioned above, Russia initially placed an embargo on imports from several Western nations. Then,
he turned to China for financing cooperation. If the two nations continue seeking closer ties they could
alter the geopolitical climate. This might also disrupt U.S-China relations; this would be a disturbing
issue for the U.S. since China holds much of the U.S. debt through financing. Russia’s lack of reliance on
the West for improving their economy would severely limit the usefulness of sanctions as a deterrent for
Russian aggression. This would reduce the capacity of the U.S. and Europe to limit Putin’s power
without a use of force.

Current domestic political initiatives that drain the system and increase federal
debt also serve Russia in its race to the top. It is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and
improve itself domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent
years. Increases in entitlement spending on healthcare, housing, etc. will unsurprisingly reduce
spending on the military, intelligence community, and other security related endeavors required
to protect the Homeland. The emerging socialist and liberal ideologies that focus on dismantling
the business infrastructure of the United States will bankrupt the economy leading to a state that
will no longer have the ability to curb aggression or stabilize the international system. Before
the U.S. loses its place as the de facto leader of the international community policymakers must
take control of both domestic and foreign concerns and “place greater emphasis on other
dimensions of national power such as innovation, education, the ability to balance intelligently
force and diplomacy, and the quality of political leadership.”338
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Appendix A

Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation
We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, joined by a common destiny on
our own land, establishing human rights and freedoms, civic peace and accord, preserving
historically developed state unity, proceeding from the universally recognized principles of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors, who have conveyed
to us the love for the native land,

belief in goodness and justice, reviving the sovereign

statehood of Russia and asserting the inviolability of its democratic basis, seeking to ensure the
well-being and prosperity of Russia on the basis of responsibility for our Fatherland to present
and future generations, considering ourselves a part of the world community, adopt the
CONSTITUTION of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION.339

339

Translation by Stephanie A.W. King.
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